By Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, U.S. Navy (Retired)
This H-gram covers Naval Operations in the Korean War from March to July 1951, including carrier task force operations in the Formosa Strait (including the USS JOHN A. BOLE incident,) “Carlson’s Canyon” air strikes, the torpedo strike on Hwachon Dam, and the floating mine strike on destroyer USS WALKE.
By Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, U.S. Navy (Retired)This H-gram discusses the War in Vietnam from the Son Tay POW camp rescue attempt in November 1970 to the end of 1971.
By Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, U.S. Navy (Retired)This H-gram continues the story of the U.S. Navy in Desert Storm in February 1991.
Provided by Museum of the Pacific WarThe National Museum of the Pacific War presents an oral interview with Donald Mac Showers..
By Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, U.S. Navy (Retired)This H-gram focuses on the last month of Desert Shield before the transition to Desert Storm combat.
By Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 30 November 2020
This H-gram focuses on the Communist Chinese intervention and offensive in Korea in November-December 1950 that resulted in a debacle for UN forces, although the U.S. Marines made an epic fighting withdrawal at Chosin Reservoir. Also during this period Naval Aviator LTJG Thomas Hudner was awarded the Medal of Honor for his attempt to rescue ENS Jesse Brown, the first African-American carrier aviator.
Also covered is the 75th Anniversary of the loss of all five Avengers of Flight 19 and the PBM Mariner sent to search for them.
by J. Michael Dahm, senior national security researcher at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics LaboratoryIn the information age, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believe that success in combat will be realized by winning a struggle for information superiority in the operational batttlespace. China’s informationized warfare strategy and information-centric operational concepts are central to how the PLA will generate combat power
By Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 6 August 2020
This series is a departure from my normal H-grams in that this is a personal recollection. I was the Iraqi Subject Matter Expert on the Intelligence Staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command for the entirety of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, serving under VADM Hank Mauz and VADM Stan Arthur. I first wrote this a number of years after the fact but I kept it true to what I believed and understood to be true at the time, so my dim view of Joint Operations as conducted during Desert Storm (which held the Navy back from making maximum contribution to the war) and U.S. Central Command, particularly the Intelligence Support Architecture, will be readily apparent. My penance for this heresy was to spend 12 of the next 21 years in joint commands, including three years as Commander of the U.S. Central Command Joint Intelligence Center, in which I had the opportunity to see vast improvement in U.S. Joint Operations.
By Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 2 September 2020
At the time of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, senior decision-making authority in Japan was vested in the six-member Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, three of whom were active duty or retired Imperial Japanese Navy admirals. The ultimate decision-maker in Imperial Japan was Emperor Hirohito, whom the Japanese believed to be divine. However making mistakes is bad for a divinity’s reputation, so the Emperor only directly intervened on rare and extremely important matters. Emperor Hirohito was routinely kept informed of the course of the war, and it became increasingly common for senior leaders of the Army and Navy to apologize to the Emperor when something went badly. Nevertheless, the Emperor rarely directly told any government, Army or Navy leaders what to do.