Fatah al-Islam: An Analytic Discussion of the Rise and Fall of an al-Qaida Linked Group in Lebanon

By

CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Introduction

Naval intelligence professionals specializing in the Middle East and CENTCOM Area of Operation, need not only to read about the region, but engage in discussion with fellow colleagues on what was read, seen, and heard.  This cultivates a sharper analytic mind, as you defend your perceptions and have your biases exposed that could cloud analysis.  I have had the privilege of engaging in such discussions with military and civilian intelligence professionals and have reduced some of my observations into notes. My own expertise revolves around Militant Islamist groups and the following are excerpts of the level of discussions engaged on the challenges facing Lebanon. It is hoped this short piece will stimulate you to join the debate and share your own views in the pages of the Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly. 

Fatah al-Islam: The Rise and Fall of an Al-Qaida Inspired Movement

The 2009 June elections in Lebanon offered a refreshing glimmer of hope in a nation that could lapse into renewed sectarian violence that al-Qaida affiliates provide a serious catalyst.  Through these recent elections Hizbullah and Islamist political groups suffered losses, with gains made by secular groups.  This forces, through plebiscite, Islamists, mainly Hizbullah, to now operate within a political spectrum that includes a stronger secular presence.  Two years ago, the Lebanese had to contend with a potent al-Qaida affiliate led by Shakir al-Absi’s Fatah al-Islam (FAI).  This al-Qaida linked group offers many lessons for those wanting to understand the life and death of an al-Qaida inspired movement.  Of note, FAI’s leader Shakir al-Absi, would be endorsed openly by al-Qaida senior leaders in Pakistan after the destruction of his group in 2007 at the hands of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).  There is no question that the rise and fall of FAI is being analyzed carefully by al-Qaida to learn lessons from its failure. 

FAI was an entity that had too many enemies, a group that was not even accepted by Islamist groups like Hamas, and even less accepted by the kaleidoscope of Palestinian rejectionist groups, chief among those is Fatah.  Operating within Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, FAI’s model of not compromising taken from al-Qaida, made it vulnerable to betrayal and outright altercations with more powerful Islamist and secular Palestinian armed entities.  These Palestinian entities could only contain FAI, and it would take intervention by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to destroy the group, which numbered between 100-200 fighters.  FAI would make its last stand at the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon.  Because of FAI’s penchant for sowing sectarian violence, they upset the Shiite powerhouse Hizbullah, who controlled and maintained a watchful eye outside the camp.

Into the Mind and Ideology of Fatah al-Islam 

Counter-terrorism analysis requires an immersion into the ideology to the point of empathy, not sympathy; this is to enter the mind of our adversary.  The ideology of FAI, like that of al-Qaida, is reductionist, taking the complexity and diversity of Islam and reducing it to selections of and inspirations from:

Muslim Brotherhood diatribe (not its pragmatic but violent history of this group)

Wahabism (the intolerance of Salafism, but ignoring Saudi clerical condemnation of Qutbist Militant Thought or al-Qaida itself).

Essam al-Barqawi (aka Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi) theories of al-Wala wal Bara, an extreme interpretation of alliance with Muslims and enmity to non-Muslims, however al-Qaida takes this concept further by demonizing all Muslims who do not share in their vision.

Mumtaz Daghmash, who advocated the creation of Jaysh al-Islam fee Gaza (The Islamic Army of Gaza).  The notion of a militant Islamist guerilla group in Gaza free from the taint of politicization found in Hamas or Fatah. 

Al-Absi, leader of FAI, was intrigued by the splintering of Fatah into numerous militant groups after the 1983 Intifada (Uprising).  He viewed the splintering as creating dozens of Fatah’s and is likely why he chose the name Fatah al-Islam when he formed his new group in 2006.  Born in 1955, Absi joined Yasser Arafat’s Fatah in Tunisia, and supposedly trained as a MiG-23 fighter pilot in Libya.  If true, his use as a frontline fighter by Fatah in its 1982 war with Israel in Lebanon was a waste of his skills.  Al-Absi’s journey involves time with al-Qaida in Iraq learning the sectarian violence techniques of the late AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, his attempt to reenter Syria led to his arrest, but the Syrians simply deported him to Lebanon.  This was an odd choice for the Syrians to make as al-Absi was wanted by the Jordanians, and the Jordanians requested his extradition, but instead sent him to Lebanon.  The Jordanians wanted al-Absi for the murder of American diplomat Laurence Foley in October 2002.  This assassination was perpetrated at the behest of al-Qaida in Iraq, and executed by Absi.

In early 2006, al-Absi left Fatah Intifadah, and created with a few dozen followers Fatah al-Islam (FAI) in the Badawi Refugee Camp.  In August 2006, the Syrians disowned FAI and linked them to al-Qaida, al-Absi was likely frustrated with the level of Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) infiltration in many of these Palestinian groups.  In 2006, he would begin in the Palestinian Camp Burj al-Barajinah in South Beirut, and then onto Badawi where he joined Fatah al-Intifadah and formed FAI, moving his operations to Nahr al-Barid Refugee Camp and taking over by force a Fatah al-Intifadah outpost within the camp.  Al-Absi has relations with Abu Khalid al-Umlah, who created militant Islamist cells in Damascus composed of Palestinians and other Arabs with experience fighting U.S. forces in Iraq.  It is unknown the extent of which al-Umlah provided al-Absi with recruits, but when the Syrians began cracking down on FAI fighters crossing Syria from Iraq, and UN Resolution 1559 upset Absi.  The resolution called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the disarmament of militias, with the largest looser of this clause being Hizbullah.  To date, the disarming of militias have been ignored.  One theory was that FAI began conceptually, when Absi encountered a mixture of Levantines (Syrians, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Lebanese) fighting for al-Qaida in Iraq. 

Conclusion

FAI conducted attacks on busses in Christian enclaves, robbed a bank of about $125,000, planned to assassinate pro-western politicians, and made tenuous alliances with other Sunni Militant Islamist groups in other refugee camps like Jund al-Sham (Army of the Levant).  FAI would also publicly threaten UNIFIL forces in Lebanon, killing six Spanish soldiers.  It is likely one of the Sunni Militant Islamist groups conducted the attack, and FAI cannot be ruled out as a suspect.  It planned to establish an al-Qaida linked presence, having aspirations of possibly representing Bin Laden in the Levant to achieve what the al-Qaida leader always hoped for, a chance to strike Israel.  In response to the bank robbery, Lebanese security attempted to arrest members of FAI in May 12th, 2007, FAI would kill the security officers a red-line that would lead to army intervention.  The Lebanese Armed Forces would surround the camp and begin a 105 day siege of Nahr al-Barid.  In late May 2007, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), an al-Qaeda mouthpiece that issues statements by the terrorist organization's leaders: “Sons of Islam, o sons of the nation of Allah and Jihad, our brothers in the Nahr el-Bared camp in Lebanon are being subjected to the flagrant aggression of the army working for treason and apostasy, the Lebanese Army.”  FAI used Katyusha rockets to fire on Lebanese Army positions, and the Lebanese Army responded with mortar fire, armor, and artillery.  The compact and tight nature of the camps meant that block by block fighting was necessary to evict FAI, and Palestinian groups like Fatah aided the Lebanese Army.  The FAI created a humanitarian crisis in their altercation with the Lebanese Army, as thousands of refugees had to evacuate their homes, and FAI attempted to hide among civilians.  Absi would escape and issued a few audios before completely disappearing from jihadist websites. 

Despite al-Qaida incitement during the 2007 Siege of Nahr al-Barid, Hizbullah, Fatah, and most of the Lebanese public supported the actions of the Lebanese Army.  Even groups sympathetic to FAI like Usbat al-Ansar and Jund al-Sham would not come to its aid, as it was likely deemed that FAI took on the army without being ready and brought this upon itself.  Among the FAI fighters found in the rubble, were individuals involved in an attempted 2006 bombing of German rail system, an unexploded bomb was found on train tracks.  Absi remains at large, and there is no confirmation of his death to date.  What can be learned from FAI?  Like al-Qaida their ideology prevents them from creating a real grass-roots movement, and creates so many enemies that they cannot transition from terrorism to political compromise.  By following al-Qaida’s world-view it is a dead-end ideology that will result in no political gains, and perpetual conflict, mainly with local and regional groups.  Then there are the complexities and nuances among these groups, while Usbat al-Ansar, Jund al-Sham, and Fatah al-Islam are sympathetic to al-Qaida, they have different leaders, and levels of patience to achieve their objectives, the key is to understand what makes then different.  In addition, while Hamas and Hizbullah despise the United States, they both abhor al-Qaida affiliates and sympathizers in their midst.  There are clear ideological differences between Hamas and al-Qaida, with the latter representing a fringe group within Islamist political groups.  Wherever there is a strong Hamas, Hizbullah, or Muslim Brotherhood presence, al-Qaida has a harder time establishing itself.  Future intelligence analysts need to appreciate these nuances as they advise Combatant Commanders and policymakers on ways to counter violent militant Islamists.

Editor’s Note:  CDR Aboul-Enein has spoken to hundreds of analysts on the evolution of militant Islamist ideology.  From 2006 to 2009, he served as Senior Advisor on Militant Islamist Ideology at the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism.  He has also had the privilege of advising at the highest levels of the Defense Department.  This column represents his own opinions, and does not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  CDR Aboul-Enein wishes to thank YN1 (AW/SW) Gavin Irby, USN who is pursuing his studies in Homeland Security at the University of Maryland University College, for his edits and discussion that enhanced the piece.